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Changes in the Israeli banking system 
Meir Sokoler 
I. Introduction 
During the last decade the Israeli economy has undergone a huge structural change - the share of the 
advanced high sector has grown significantly at the expense of the more traditional sectors. However, 
this considerable structural change has not yet been matched by a similar change in the Israeli 
financial structure. Commercial banks continue to dominate the allocation of savings to investment. 
Yet recently a financial reform bill (the Bachar reform) was passed in the Knesset which will 
undoubtedly affect Israel’s financial structure, and which will also have profound effects on Israeli 
banks. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the planned effects of the Bachar reform on the local financial 
scene with emphasis on the reform’s effects on: a) the nature of banking business, b) competition 
within the banking system as a whole, and c) the stability of the banking system. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section II describes the main features of the Israeli banking 
system, emphasizing its dominant role in financial intermediation in Israel, its high concentration and 
the (at least potential) conflict of interest contained within it. Section III examines the major proposals 
of the Bachar Committee, whose main purpose is to deal with the joint problem of high concentration 
and conflicts of interest within the banking system. Section IV attempts to evaluate the role that 
commercial banks will play in the future, following the implementation of the Committee’s proposals. 
Section V offers a brief conclusion. 
II.  The Dominant Role of Commercial Banks in the Israeli Financial System 
At present the financial system in Israel is largely dominated by banks and the banking system itself is 
dominated by the two largest banks (Hapoalim and Leumi). The dominance of these two banks is a 
result of their control over other financial institutions such as provident funds, mutual funds and 
underwriters, credit card companies and others. 
A major result of this financial structure is that at the end of 2004 more than 55% of the Israeli public’s 
assets were controlled directly (via bank deposits) or indirectly (through accounts with provident and 
mutual funds) by banks (Table 1). 
A similar picture emerges with respect to sources of finance. In 2004, about 76% of the sources of 
finance to the business sector came from bank credit or from credit extended by provident funds that 
are owned and controlled by banks (Table 2). 
There is also a high degree of concentration within the banking system. The largest two banks control 
most of the deposits, credit mutual funds, provident funds and underwriting activities (Table 3). 
By international standards the Israeli banking system is highly concentrated (Diagram 1), and not very 
competitive (Diagram 2). 
The dominance of banks is also evident in secondary market trading (Diagram 3). 
The high degree of concentration in itself would be an impenetrable barrier to entry were it not 
combined with structural conflicts of interest which, according to the Bachar Committee’s report, 
include the following: 
•  Banks are both (investment) advisers and owners/managers of provident and mutual funds. 
They have an incentive to advise their customers to invest in financial products of the entities 
under their control, and have done so on many occasions. 250  BIS Papers No 28
 
•  Banks are both underwriters and credit providers; they have an incentive to underwrite 
selected borrowers where the proceeds are used to repay loans. 
•  They also have an incentive to channel the funds of the institutions under their control to 
purchase issues of companies under their control. 
•  Banks are both providers of a wide range of commercial banking activities and 
owners/managers of provident and mutual funds; they have an incentive to structure their 
activities in this way as these institutions receive the commercial banking services from the 
parent bank, without considering possible better alternatives. This is a very common practice 
in Israel. 
The above mentioned conflicts of interest are well entrenched despite the vast array of restrictions and 
regulations (“Chinese walls”) designed to control them. In the words of the State Comptroller, “the 
Chinese walls set up by the Bank of Israel (BOI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) are not strong 
enough to overcome conflicts of interest and entail regulatory cost”. 
Some empirical evidence on the results of the pervasive conflicts of interest in the banking system is 
provided in a study by Bar and Kosanko (2004). They compare the yields on shares recommended by 
two types of analysts: independent and non-independent - those employed by banks making up a 
large portion of the latter group. The result presented in Diagram 4 clearly shows how independent 
analysts outperform the other group. 
III.  The Bachar Committee Proposals 
•  The combination of a high degree of concentration with far reaching conflicts of interest has 
created a vicious cycle that perpetuates the status quo. Concentration taken together with an 
involvement in a wide variety of activities creates structural conflicts of interest; and the 
exploitation of these conflicts serves to preserve the concentration. 
•  Because all attempts to curtail conflicts of interest through Chinese walls have failed, 
deliberate government intervention in the structure of ownership and the activities of financial 
intermediaries, including banks, is required in order to break the above mentioned vicious 
cycle.  
  Three major principles guided the recommendations of the Bachar Committee, which 
comprised representatives from all of the regulatory and supervisory authorities dealing with 
Israel’s capital market.
1 
The principles are: 
•  Enhancing competition in the management of the public’s financial assets by developing 
alternative investment vehicles to those offered by banks, and by decentralizing the 
management of existing investment vehicles. 
•  Enhancing competition in credit provision by developing non-bank credit instruments. 
•  Enhancing competition vis-à-vis the household sector by exposing households more to 
non-bank assets and by adopting measures that would make it easier to switch from one 
bank to another. 
(a)  Separation of Provident and Mutual Funds from Banks - both Ownership and 
Management 
Banks should not be permitted to hold any interest at all, either directly or indirectly, in provident and 
mutual funds. Neither should banks manage the funds of these institutions (nor their portfolios). 
                                                       
1  The Committee included the Securities Authority, the Antitrust Authority, the BOI, including the Bank Supervision 
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Banks should separate from the ownership-management interests in provident and mutual funds 
according to the following timetable (Table 4). 
A different timetable applies to “large” banks and to “medium-sized and small” banks, in order to 
improve the competitive edge of the small and medium-sized banks.
2 
(b)  Limiting Large Banks’ Underwriting Activities 
Due to conflicts of interest in the activities of underwriters, especially between their interest in acting 
on behalf of related debtors and their fiduciary undertakings to the investing public, the proposal is that 
an underwriter should not be permitted to serve in a price setting capacity in any public offering if it has 
loaned large sums of money to the issuing company - i.e. if the issuing company’s outstanding debt to 
the underwriter exceeds NIS 5 million, and comprises more than 10% of the issuing company’s 
outstanding total financial liabilities. 
Furthermore, in order to limit underwriters’ ability to reward related entities with “attractive” issues, or 
alternatively, to limit their ability to sell unsuccessful issues to such entities, the proposal states than 
an underwriter should not be permitted to sell 5% or more of the value of securities offered in an issue 
to itself or to all the institutional entities in its group put together. 
These limitations will considerably restrict the leading role of the largest two banks in underwriting 
activities. 
(c)  Steps to Limit Concentration Among Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries 
In order to reduce the risk of serious concentration among non-bank financial intermediaries, the 
Committee proposes that no acquisition permits be granted if, after the acquisition, the purchaser and 
its group of affiliated companies will control more than 15% of the market share of long term pension 
funds and life insurance portfolios savings or more than a 20% share of the mutual fund market. 
These steps are intended to prevent the migration of concentration from the banking industry to life 
insurance companies and other branches of the capital market; it will lead to a decentralization of 
decision making centers and increase the probability of attracting international financial intermediaries. 
It should be emphasized that the limitations on the size of market shares pertain solely to mergers and 
acquisitions: they will not apply to an increase in market shares emanating from growth and 
competition. 
(d)  Expanding the Range of Banks in Selling Pension Products 
In order to exploit better the use of banks’ consulting and distribution networks, and to afford more 
convenient access to financial services, the Committee has recommended expanding the range of 
pension and life insurance products. Until now banks were prohibited from selling these products. The 
provision of financial advice along with the distribution of these products at bank branches will make 
the products more easily accessible to large segments of the population and will provide a new source 
of income for the banks. 
Once again, the Committee recommends different “market entry conditions” for “large” and “medium-
sized and small” banks. 
                                                       
2  “Large banks” are defined as banking corporations belonging to a banking group whose equity exceeds NIS 10 billion (at the 
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IV.  The Role of Banks in Israel’s Financial Structure 
It is believed that as a result of the reform, and additional complementary steps, particularly those 
pertaining to supervision and corporate governance, the future Israeli financial structure will be 
composed of three major pillars: 
(a)  Classical commercial banking, which will also include financial advice and the distribution of 
pension and life insurance products. 
(b)  Life insurance companies, which will be the main producers of pension and annuity products. 
(c)  Investment banking, which will mainly be responsible for helping businesses to raise funds in 
the capital market. 
In addition, it is believed that the reform will contribute greatly to the already deepening secondary 
markets for FX, bonds, shares and derivatives (Diagram 5). 
The effects of these changes on the future of the Israeli banking system are of course uncertain, but 
the following observations can nevertheless be made; First, the growth of non-bank sources of finance 
relative to bank credit is set to continue (Diagram 6). 
Second, the high concentration of bank credit is likely to be reduced, affording small and medium-
sized businesses greater access to such credit. 
Third, it is likely that the presence of foreign financial institutions, including foreign banks, will increase. 
At present, there are two foreign banks in Israel, servicing mostly large corporations and offering 
private banking services. 
Fourth, the growth in the secondary markets will increase the risk sharing capacity of the economy as 
a whole and that of the banking system in particular. Israeli banks are beginning to look for ways to 
securitize part of their loans portfolio. 
Fifth, as the business sector is likely to raise more funds through the capital market, banks will turn 
greater attention to the household sector. 
Sixth, banks’ role in consulting on and distributing pension and life insurance products is likely to grow 
considerably. This will require them to develop new skills and greater internal supervision. It should be 
noted that the law in Israel requires licensing for both financial and pension advisers. 
Seventh, mark to market accounting practices are likely to become more prevalent, which will increase 
the discipline imposed on banks by the financial markets. 
V. Conclusion 
Following the adoption of the Bachar reform, the financial scenery in Israel is going to change 
considerably. The dominance of banks in the financial system will be reduced. Banks will not own or 
manage mutual funds or provident funds. The two largest banks are going to be more restricted in 
their underwriting activities. 
On the other hand, banks will be able to engage in activities from which they are presently barred. This 
includes distributing pension and life insurance products. 
The proposed reform will also help to further develop both the primary and the secondary capital 
market. This will enhance securitization activities, which banks can exploit to better allocate and share 
risk. This, in turn, will improve the functioning of the economy and also be of benefit to the banks 
themselves. BIS Papers No 28  253
 
Table 1 
Assets Managed by Banks 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
NIS billion 
Deposits in banks  418.8 445.5  463.5 461.7 460.9 
Total assets of provident funds managed by 
banks 147  152.5  146.5  165  179.5 
Total assets of mutual funds managed by 
banks  39.0  56.4 40.6 74.8 86.6 
Total assets of the public managed by banks  604.8  654.4 650.6 701.5 727.0 
Total assets of the private sector 973.6  1,071.3  1,160.2 1,227.7 1,308.8 
Share of assets managed by banks in the total 





Banks’ Share in Financial Activity, 2000 to 2004 
% 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Share of banks and of provident funds managed by 
banks (%) in           
Total assets of the financial sector (gross)  78  78  77  75  74 
Total  credit  62 61 61 59 57 
Total credit to the private sector  88  88  86  85  84 





Banking Sector Concentration 
Banking  Mutual funds  Provident funds  Underwriting 
Deposits  Credits  Assets managed  Assets managed  Number of issues 
Poalim - 30%  Poalim - 33%  Poalim - 36%  Poalim - 41%  Poalim - 27% 
Leumi - 30%  Leumi - 30%  Leumi - 31%  Leumi - 19%  Leumi -24% 
IDB - 18%  IDB - 13%  IDB - 13%  IDB - 13%  Clal - 14% 
78% 76% 80% 73% 65% 
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Table 4 
Indicators of Quality of Bank Loans 
Percentages 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Problematic loans/total loans  7.0  9.0 10.1 10.6 10.9 
Non-performing loans/total loans 1.5  1.7  2.5 2.6 2.6 































































































































































































a    For Italy, Germany, the US, France, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Norway and Ireland the H-Index is 
calculated from data relating to 2002.   
b  For Israel the H-Index is calculated from data relating to 2004. 




1 Index for measuring contestability of 
selected banking systems - intenational comparison 
 
Diagram 3 
Composition of Turnover: The Five Large Banking 
Groups, Other Banks, and Non-bank Members 


















The five large banking groups  Other banks Non-bank members of 
the Stock Exchange 































































































































































































































































































































































































The data source: (1) Claessens & Laeven, “What Drives Bank Competition?: Some International Evidence” (2003). (2) The 
data of the countries are annual averages for the period 1994-2001. (3) Israel's peer group consists of eight countries that 
have similar characteristics - size of the economy, size & concentration of the banking systems - Denmark, Greece, 
Norway, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, South Africa. (4) The data for Israel is annual averages for the period 1997-2003. 
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Diagram 4 
Analysts with Equity Stakes vs. Independent Analysts: 
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Diagram 6 
Annual Changes in Credit to the Business Sector, 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
percent 
Rate of change of total credit  Rate of change of bank credit 
Rate of change of nonbank credit 
a  Cumulative changes in credit till June 2005. Rates of changes in credit are in annual terms. 